Starliner's first uncrewed orbital test exposed multiple software-integration failures, beginning with a mission elapsed timer set almost eleven hours wrong and expanding into a broad review of Boeing and NASA verification processes.
Phobos 1 was lost after an erroneous ground command disabled attitude control, exposing how operational command validation and leftover test functions can be as dangerous as onboard code defects.
Clementine completed its lunar mapping mission but lost its planned asteroid flyby when an onboard software failure left an attitude-control thruster firing for about eleven minutes.
Ariane 5 Flight 501 failed when reused inertial-reference software converted a value outside the range expected from Ariane 4, raising an exception that shut down both redundant units.
Mars Climate Orbiter was lost when ground software produced thruster-impulse data in pound-force seconds while the navigation interface expected newton-seconds, and project processes failed to detect the mismatch.
Mars Polar Lander was never heard from after descent; the review board concluded the most probable cause was a false touchdown indication generated when the landing legs deployed, leading software to shut the engines off too early.
Schiaparelli's descent failed after unexpectedly high rotation saturated its inertial sensor; the navigation software integrated the bad attitude estimate until it calculated a negative altitude and ended powered descent too early.
Mariner 1 became famous as a punctuation catastrophe, but the documented failure was subtler: a guidance-system notation error interacted with a hardware tracking problem and inadequate verification.